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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
EXCESSIVE PUBLICATION IN DEFAMATION
By JoHN E. HALLEN*
IN order to maintain an action of defamation there must be a
statement seen or heard by a party other than the plaintiff or
defendant, and that party must have no interest that the law will
recognize in receiving that information. If the statement is made
only to the plaintiff there is no publication, and if the statement
is made to one with a recognized interest the statement is privil-
eged, at least in the absence of malice. If a defamatory statement
is made to one who has no interest in the subject matter, an action
ordinarily will lie. But there are many cases (1) where notices
posted for the benefit of interested employees are read by others,
or (2) where statements made to the plaintiff or a privileged
party are heard by others, or (3) where defendant employs
stenographers, telegraph operators or other agencies in getting the
message to an interested party, or (4) where newspapers, circu-
lars and reports are sent both to parties with a recognized interest
and to those without such interest. In these cases recovery is
sometimes granted to the plaintiff because of excessive or tin-
justified pl)lication, undue publicity, or actual malice, and some-
times denied on the basis of lack of publication, privilege, or lack
of malice.
In all these cases it would seem that when the statement is
brought to the attention of someone other than the plaintiff there
is a publication. It might then be said that unless the auditor
or reader has a sufficient interest in the subject matter, liability
should follow as a matter of course. This rigorous result has been
thought to restrict unduly the use of the conditional privilege.
In certain situations the law regards it as beneficial to society for
the defendant to speak freely and hold the defendant blameless
if he speaks in good faith and without malice. The use of the
privilege would be hampered if the fact that defendant's statements
received the attention of an unprivileged party was always suf-
ficient for liability. Similar arguments have been employed in
regard to defendant's conversations with the plaintiff.
The earlier cases all dealt with situations where defendant's
*Professor of Law. Ohio State University. Columbus, Ohio.
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statements were overheard by another. Whether the statements
were made to the plaintiff or a privileged third party, the English
courts generally protected the defendant unless the plaintiff could
prove actual malice. In the leading case of Toogood v. Spyring1
the defendant, in the presence of another, accused the plaintiff
of breaking into his cellar. The court held that the presence of
a third party did not in itself make the defendant liable and that
it was at most a circumstance to go to the jury on the issue of
malice. The English courts have declared that plaintiff must
establish a set of facts that is more consistent with the presence
of malice than the absence of it, and have at times held that the
speaking in the presence of a third party,2 and even the calling
in of a third party to hear the statement,3 do not furnish sufficient
evidence to take the case to the jury. In other cases they have
held that the presence of a third party makes an issue for the
jury4 and that the summoning of unprivileged parties creates
liability.5
Many American cases have followed the lead of Toogood v.
Spyring and have made malice the decisive factor. In some cases
the jury has been permitted to consider whether the defendant,
by the use of unnecessary publicity or otherwise, was actuated by
malice.6 It has been held that while unnecessary publicity may
go to the jury as evidence, the defendant is not liable unless malice
is found,7 and that such publicity will not in itself make the de-
fendant liable.' But it has also been said that in such cases the
jury is apt to infer malice.9 At times the presence of third parties
was not regarded as sufficient to make malice an issue before the
1(1834) 1 Cr. M. & R. 181, 4 Tyr. 582, 3 L.J. Ex. 347.2Pittard v. Oliver, [1891] 1 Q. B. 474, 60 L. J. Q. B. 219, 64 L. T.
758, 7 T. L. R. 188; cf. Davies v. Snead, (1870) L. R. 5 Q. B. 608. 39
L. J. Q. B. 202, 23 L. T. 126, 609.
3Somerville v. Hawkins, (1851) 10 C. B. 583, 20 L. J. C. P. 131. 16
L. T. 0. S. 283; Taylor v. Hawkins, (1851) 20 L. J. Q. B. 313, 16
L. T. 0. S. 409.
4Padmore v. Lawrence, (1840) 11 Ad. & El. 380. 2 Per. & Day. 209. 9
L. J. Q. B. 137.5Parsons v. Surgey, (1864) 4 F. & F. 247.6Brow v. Hathaway, (1866) 95 Mass. 239; Hatch v. Lane, (1870)
105 Mass. 394; Dale v. Harris, (1872) 109 Mass. 193; Denver P. WV. Co.
v. Holloway, (1905) 34 Colo. 432, 83 Pac. 131; Kruse v. Rabe, (1910)
80 N. J. L. 378, 79 Ad. 316.7Denver P. W. Co. v. Holloway, (1905) 34 Colo. 432, 83 Pac. 131.8Brow v. Hathaway, (1866) 95 Mass. 239; Hatch v. Lane, (1870)
105 Mass. 394.
"Kruse v. Rabe. (1910) 80 N. J. L. 378, 79 Aft. 316.
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jury.10 And in many cases the fact that the statements were
heard by others seems to have been largely disregarded." It has
been said that the question is simply whether the communication is
made in good faith or is inspired by ill will."
Actual malice has been variously defined and in itself furnishes
no clear cut test. Some courts treat it as synonymous with ill
will," and almost all would agree that it implies an unworthy
motive in the mind of the defendant. 4 But, except in cases where
defendant wanted the outsiders to see or hear the statement, it is
difficult to discover much evidence of unworthy motives from
their presence. That the use of the term, "actual malice," is
often indefinitely extended may be seen by an examination of the
cases involving a conditionally privileged defendant who speaks
without probable cause. The English"r and some American 0
authorities would protect the defendant, while other American
cases' 7 would hold him liable, and in some instances it is intimated
that the lack of probable cause constitutes malice.' Whatever
"°Fahr v. Hayes, (1888) 50 N. J. L. 275, 13 At!. 261; cf. Parr v.
Warren Lumber Co., (S.D. 1931) 236 N. W. 291.
"lBeeler v. Jackson, (1885) 64 Md. 589, 2 At!. 916; McCarty v.
Lambley, (1897) 20 App. Div. 264, 46 N. Y. S. 792; Hebner v. Great
Northern Ry., (1899) 78 Minn. 289, 80 N. W. 1128; Farley v. Thalheimer,
(1905) 103 Va. 504, 49 S. E. 644; Phillips v. Bradshaw, (1910) 167 Ala.
199, 52 So. 662; Bavington v. Robinson, (1914) 124 Md. 85, 91 Atd. 777.
cf. Moore v. Butler, (1868) 48 N. H. 161.
1Phillips v. Bradshaw, (1910) 167 Ala. 199, 52 So. 662.
"'Brown v. Norfolk & W. R. Co., (1902) 100 Va. 619, 42 S. E. 664;
Childs v. Erhard, (1917) 226 Mass. 454, 115 N. E. 924; Berot v. Porte,(1919) 144 La. 805, 81 So. 323.
"4Dickson v. Earl of Wilton, (1859) 1 F. & F. 419, 427; Doan v.
Grew, (1915) 220 Mass. 171, 107 N. E. 620; N. Y. & Porto Rico S. S.
Co. v. Garcia, (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1926) 16 F. (2d) 734.
"sClark v. Molyneaux, (1877) 3 Q. B. D. 237, 47 L. J. Q. B. 230, 37
L. T. 694; Jenoure v. Delmege, [1891] A. C. 73, 60 L. J. P. C. 11, 63 L. T.
814; British Ry. Traffic Co. v. C. R. C. Co., [1922] 2 K. B. 260, 91 L. J.
K. B. 824, 126 L. T. 602.16Ely v. Mason, (1921) 97 Conn. 38, 115 Atl. 479; Bays v. Hunt,
(1882) 60 Iowa 251; Hemmens v. Nelson, (1893) 138 N. Y. 517, 34 N. E.
342; Popke v. Hoffman, (1926) 21 Ohio App. 454, 153 N. E. 248; 1. &
G. N. R. Co. v. Edmundson, (Tex. Comm. App. 1920) 222 S. W. 181;
Joseph v. Baars, (1910) 142 Wis. 390, 125 N. W. 913.
"7Carpenter v. Bailey, (1873) 53 N. H. 590; Stevenson v. Morris
(1927) 288 Pa. St. 405, 136 Atl. 234; Lescale v. Schwartz, (1906) 119
La. 293, 40 So. 708; Hodgkins v. Gallagher, (1922) 122 Me. 112, 119 At!.
68. Cf. Connor v. Taylor, (1930) 233 Ky. 706, 26 S. W. (2d) 561; Cristman
v. Cristman, (1889) 36 Ill. App. 567.
'
8Elms v. Crane, (1919) 118 Me. 261, 107 At!. 852; Cobb v. Garlington,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1917) 193 S. W. 463; Hoeppner v. Dunkirk Printing Co.,
(1930) 254 N. Y. 95, 172 N. E. 139.
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disposition should be made of such cases, 9 it seems a strained
construction of the term "malice," to call a negligent defendant,
who may be actuated by the best of motives, malicious. And so
here in the cases of excessive publication, some American courts
pay little or no attention to the element of malice, but instead
inquire whether the fact that defendant's statement was heard
or seen by a party without interest in the subject matter creates
liability.
Some cases have held that the presence of others ipso facto
causes the communication to lose the privilege."' Replies to
questions, charges. of crime, and statements of suspicion have all
been summarily declared unprivileged because of the presence of
third parties. Sometimes a court, with its attention centered on
the element of publication, declares that defendant is liable for
words spoken to the plaintiff, if they were heard by others."
Notices placed in railroad offices, clearly privileged to some em-
ployees, have been held actionable if read by other employees 2 or a
considerable number of the public. -3 When defendant secures the
presence of uninterested parties,'24 or when he "selects the occa-
sion,'1 5 protection has been refused. It has been briefly stated
that defendant is liable if the communication is unnecessarily
made public.' 8
Other courts give less weight to the fact that the words were
overheard. Reliance is often placed upon the statement in Too-
good v. Spjring,27 that the casual presence of a third party will
not make the declaration actionable.' -  Liability is not created
merely because the statement was "incidentally" overheard' or
19See H.llen, Character of Belief Necessary for the Conditional
Privilege in Defamation, (1931) 25 Ill. L. Rev. 865.
2OWebber v. Vincent, (1890) 9 N. Y. S. 101; Fowlie v. Cruse, (1916)
52 Mont. 222, 157 Pac. 958; Perry Bros. Variety Stores v. Layton, (Tex.
Comm. App. 1930) 25 S. W. (2d) 310.2
'Nichols v. Chicago R. L & P. Ry. Co, (Mo. App. 1921) 232 S. W.
275; Allen v. Edward Light Co., (1921) 209 Mo. App. 165, 233 S. W. 953.
"2Sheftall v. Central of Ga. Ry. Co., (1905) 123 Ga. 589, 51 S. E. 646.23Ramsdell v. Penn. R. R. Co., (1910) 79 N. J. L. 379, 75 Ati. 444.
241vester v. Coe, (1925) 33 Ga. App. 620, 127 S. E. 790.
25Fields v. Bynum, (1911) 156 N. C. 413, 72 S. E. 449.
26Lanham v. Keys, (1924) 31 Ga. App. 635, 121 S. E. 856.27(1834) 1 Cr. M. & R. 181, 4 Tyr. 582, 3 L. J. Ex. 347.
28Brow v. Hathaway, (1866) 95 Mass. 239; Phillips v. Bradshaw,(1910) 167 Ala. 199, 52 So. 662; Conrad v. Roberts. (1915) 95 Kan. 180,
147 Pac. 795.
29McKenzie v. Burns Detective Agency, (1921) 149 Minn. 311, 183
N. W. 516; cf. Parr v. Warren-Lamb Lumber Co., (S.D. 1931) 236 N. W.
291.
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thus brought to the attention of a stenographer.8 0 Courts have
said that the presence of a third party, if accidental or in the
course of business, would not be sufficient to maintain an action,3 1
nor would a casual reading by a member of the public. 32 Replies
by defendant to plaintiff's questions have frequently been pro-
tected, although made before parties who accompanied the plain-
tiff. 3 At times the defendant has been held not liable for state-
ments made at meetings, so long as he was not responsible for
the presence of uninterested parties .
4
Even in these cases malice may be important, because the de-
fendant may be actuated by hatred or other unworthy motives,
and would lose the benefit of a conditional privilege. And when
defendant speaks to or of the plaintiff in a crowded place, some
evidence of defendant's attitude may be secured. But in many
cases the fact that the words were overheard offers little or no
evidence, if malice is properly limited to an unworthy motive in the
defendant's mind. In this situation may courts seem to feel that
they must either hold for the plaintiff and defeat the privilege by
expanding actual malice or ignore it by pointing to the publication,
or else hold for the defendant and support the privilege by
dismissing an admitted publication as incidental. It would seem
that the cases might more fairly be decided upon a basis of the
reasonableness of defendant's acts.
The defendant, however good his intentions, may or may not
have acted prudently in speaking the words which were over-
heard. Certainly the fact that an outsider heard the words should
not, without more, be decisive. A conversation in a private room
might possibly be overheard in the next room, but would not, in
the absence of raised voices, show any lack of due care. A
storekeeper who cries out when a theft is apparently being com-
30Bohlinger v. Germania Life Ins. Co., (1911) 100 Ark. 477, 140
S. W. 257. ("This privilege was not lost because the report was incidental-
ly brought to the notice of the stenographer in the office of Powell &
Doyle.")
31N. Y. & Porto Rico S. S. Co. v. Garcia, (C.C.A. Ist Cir. 1926)
16 F. (2d) 734; cf. Kruse v. Rabe, (1910) 80 N. J. L. 378, 79 At. 316;
Fields v. Bynum, (1911) 156 N. C. 413, 72 S. E. 449.32 Cf. Sheftall v. Central of Ga. Ry. Co., (1905) 123 Ga. 589, 51
S. E. 646; Ramsdell v. Penn. R. R. Co., (1910) 79 N. J. L. 379, 75 Atl. 444.
33Brice v. Curtis, (1912) 38 D. C. App. 304; Laughlin v. Schnitzer,(Tex. Civ. App. 1907) 106 S. W. 908; Beeler v. Jackson, (1885) 64 Md. 589,
2 AtI. 916. Cf. Sanborn v. Fickett, (1898) 91 Me. 364, 40 At. 66.34Hoover v. Jordan, (1915) 27 Colo. App. 515, 150 Pac. 333; Brough-
ton v. McGrew, (C.C. Ind. Cir. 1889) 39 Fed. 672.
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mitted would act as most men would under the circumstances. It
does not follow that he might reasonably make such accusations at
a later time without first taking some precautions for privacy.
It is submitted that the non-negligent defendant would ordi-
narily be protected in this type of case. There is more doubt as
to the court's reaction to the negligent but honest defendant. The
English courts would, in all probability, excuse the defendant, since
no unworthy motive was shown. The issue has seldom been
squarely presented in America. Directly opposite results have
been reached in Kansas35 and Massachusetts " in dealing with
trial courts' instructions that defendant was liable unless he took
reasonable care not to be overheard. Occasional reference to a
negligence test is made in other cases.; It is submitted that
defendant should be held if he spoke without due care under
the circumstances, and his words were overheard by parties with-
out interest in the subject matter.
In many cases the defendant has given information to a repre-
sentative in order to acquaint the latter with certain facts, so that
defendant's interests might be better protected, or even as a means
of communicating with te plaintiff or an interested third party.
Assuming that the defendant adopts a reasonable method of com-
munication, the privilege is usually recognized.s It has been said
that what the defendant could do for himself he could have others
do for him,39 and that the privilege covers all incidents in accord
with the usual and reasonable course of business.40
The use of the typewriter has brought forth issues upon which
35Conrad v. Roberts, (1915) 95 Kan. 180, 147 Pac. 795.36Dale v. Harris, (1872) 109 Mass. 193.
-ZSheftall v. Central of Ga. Ry. Co., (1905) 123 Ga. 589, 51 S. E.
646; Hebner v. Gt. Northern Ry. Co., (1899) 78 Minn. 289, 80 N. W. 1128;
Morton v. Knipe, (1908) 128 App. Div. 94, 112 N. Y. S. 451. Cf. Cole-
man v. MacLennan, (1908) 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281.3sBohlinger v. Germania Ins. Co., (1911) 100 Ark. 477, 140 S. W.
257; Phillips v. Bradshaw, (1910) 167 Ala. 199, 52 So. 662; Nichols v.
Eaton, (1900) 110 Iowa 509, 81 N. W. 792; Hebner v. Gt. Northern Ry.
Co., (1899) 78 Minn. 289, 80 N. W. 1128; Harrison v. Garrett, (1903)
132 N. C. 172, 43 S. E. 594; Johnson v. Wurlitzer Co., (1928) 197 Wis.
432, 222 N. W. 451; Globe Furniture Co. v. Wright, (1920) 49 D. C.
App. 315, 265 Fed. 873; Sullivan v. Metropolitan Casualty Co., (C.C.A. 5th
Cir. 1919) 256 Fed. 726. Cf. Wormwood v. Lee, (1917) 226 Mass. 339,
115 N. E. 494.
19Youmans v. Smith, (1897) 153 N. Y. 214, 47 N. E. 265.
40Edmondson v. Birch & Co., Ltd., [1907] 1 K. B. 371, 76 L. J. K. B.
346, 96 L. T. 415, 23 T. L. R. 234; Osborn v. Boulter & Son, [19301 2
K. B. 226, 99 L. J. K. B. 556, 143 L. T. 460.
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the courts have differed widely. An English case 4' held the de-
fendant liable upon the ground that there was a publication and no
privilege, since the stenographer had no conceivable interest in the
subject matter. This view has some following in America. 42
An intermediate New York court held that there was no publica-
tion by a corporation when a letter was dictated by an officer of
that corporation to a stenographer and then sent to the plaintiff. 43
Several American courts have adopted this reasoning, 4 in some
of the cases the letters being sent to agents of the defendant, but
the highest New York court has recently declared that dictation to
a stenographer constitutes a publication. 45  Many courts seem
confused on the issues of publication and privilege here. 40  It
would seem, in accord with the view worked out by the later
English decisions, that there was a publication, but that the de-
fendant should be privileged if a reasonable method of com-
munication was employed. 4
7
In the early days of the mercantile agency, a federal case48 held
that the defendant could not be protected if the confidential re-
41Pullman v. Hill & Co. Ltd., [1891] 1. Q. B. 524, 60 L. J. Q. B.
299, 64 L. T. 691.
42Gambrill v. Schooley, (1901) 93 Md. 48, 48 Atd. 730. Cf. Nelson v.
Whitten, (D.C. N.Y. 1921) 272 Fed. 135; Ferdon v. Dickens, (1909) 161
Ala. 181, 49 So. 888; Berry v. City of New York Ins. Co., (1923) 210 Ala.
369, 98 So. 290; Sun Life Assurance Co. v. Bailey, (1903) 101 Va. 443,
44 S. E. 692; Modisette & Adams v. Lorenze, (1927) 163 La. 505, 112
So. 397.
43Owens v. Ogilvie Publishing Co., (1898) 32 App. Div. 465, 53 N. Y. S.
1033.
4Freeman v. Dayton Scale Co., (1929) 159 Tenn. 413, 19 S. W.(2d) 255; Prins v. Holland North American Mortgage Co., (1919) 107
Wash. 206, 181 Pac. 680; Central of Georgia Ry. v. Jones, (1916) 18
Ga. App. 414, 89 S. E. 429. Cf. Cartwright Caps Co. v. Fischel, (1917)
113 Miss. 359, 74 So. 278.
45Ostrowe v. Lee, (1931) 256 N. Y. 36, 175 N. E. 505. Cf. Kennedy
v. Butler, Inc., (1927) 245 N. Y. 204, 156 N. E. 666.
4GIn Nelson v. Whitten, (D.C. N.Y. 1921) 272 Fed. 135, the court
holds that there is a publication but the discussion seems more applicable
to the issue of privilege. Compare, also, Freeman v. Dayton Scale Co.,(1929) 159 Tenn. 413, 19 S. W. (2d) 255, and Cartwright Caps v. Fischel,(1917) 113 Miss. 359, 74 So. 278.
47Osborn v. Boulter & Son, [1930] 2 K. B. 226, 99 L. J. K. B. 556,
143 L. T. 460: Edmondson v. Birch & Co., Ltd., [1907] 1 K. B. 371. 76
L. J. K. B. 346, 96 L. T. 415, 23 T. L. R. 234; Boxsius v. Goblet Freres,[18941 1 Q. B. 842, 63 L. J. Q. B. 401, 70 L. T. 368; Globe Furniture Co. v.
Wrizht, (1920) 49 D. C. App. 315, 265 Fed. 873. Cf. Ostrowe v. Lee,(1931) 256 N. Y. 36, 175 N. E. 505; Smith, Liability of a Telegraph Com-
pany, (1920) 20 Col. L. Rev. 30.
48Beardsley v. Tappan, (C.C. N.Y. 1867) 5 Blatch. 497, Fed. Cam.
No. 1189.
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ports were seen by clerks in the office of the defendant company,
but the case has frequently been criticized as the advantages of
such organizations became apparent to the courts.'
9
Sending a message by wire constitutes publication both by the
sender" to the telegraph company, and by the telegraph company"'
when one agent sends the message to another. Even so, it should
be privileged if it is a reasonable means of communication," and
in many situations today both telegrams and typewritten letters
are so recognized.
5 3
But the telegraph, with certain inevitable publicity, is not al-
ways a proper method of communication, and defendant may
be held uiable on the basis of a wrongful or excessive publication.
Libelous messages directed to the plaintiff, at least in the absence
of provocation or invitation by the plaintiff,5 ' are actionable
against the sender5" and may be against the telegraph company.""
A defamatory letter, dictated to a stenographer and sent to the
plaintiff, might conceivably require more justification than if it
had been sent to a party with a recognized interest in the subject
matter.57 A post card, sent through the mails, may be read by
unprivileged parties, and constitute an excessive publication.-n
49Erber v. Dunn, (C.C. Ark. 1889) 12 Fed. 526; King v. Patterson,
(1887) 49 N. J. L. 417.
5OMonson v. Lathrop, (1897) 96 Wis. 386, 71 N. W. 596; Williams
v. Equitable Credit Co, (1925) 33 Ga. App. 441, 126 S. E. 855.
-5Peterson v. Western Union, (1896) 65 Minn. 18, 67 N. W. 646.
But see Western Union v. Cashman, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1905) 149 Fed. 367.5
-Edmondson v. Birch & Co. Ltd., [1907] 1 K. B. 371, 76 L. J. K. B.
346, 96 L. T. 415, 23 T. L. R. 234; Ashcroft v. Hammond, (1910) 197
N. Y. 488, 90 N. E. 1117; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown.
(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1923) 294 Fed. 167; Nye v. Western Union, (C.C. Minn.
1900) 104 Fed. 628.53Osborn v. Boulter & Son, [19301 2 K. B. 226, 99 L. J. K. B. 556,
143 L. T. 460; Edmondson v. Birch & Co. Ltd., [1907] 1 K. B. 371, 76
L. J. K. B. 346, 96 L. T. 415, 23 T. L. R. 234.
54 Compare Ashcroft v. Hammond. (1910) 197 N. Y. 488, 90 N. E.
1117, with Nelson v. Whitten, (D.C. N.Y. 1921) 272 Fed. 135.
55Williamson v. Freer, (1874) L. R. 9 C. P. 393, 43 L. J. C. P. 161.
30 L. T. 332; Monson v. Lathrop, (1897) 96 Wis. 386, 71 N. W. 596;
Williams v. Equitable Credit Co., (1925) 33 Ga. App. 441, 126 S. E. 855.
56Peterson v. Western Union, (1896) 65 Minn. 18. 67 N. XV. 646.
Cf. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1923) 294
Fed. 167; Nye v. Western Union, (C.C. Minn. 1900) 104 Fed. 628.
57Cf. Pullman v. Hill & Co. Ltd., [18911 1 Q. B. 524, 60 L. J. Q. B.
299, 64 L. T. 691, and Edmondson v. Birch & Co. Ltd., [1907] 1 K. B.
371, 76 L. J. K. B. 346, 96 L. T. 415, 23 T. L. R. 234. But see Osborn
v. Boulter & Con, [1930] 2 K. B. 226, 99 L. J. K. B. 556. 143 L. T. 460.5SLogan v. Hodges. (1907) 146 N. C. 38. 59 S. E. 349. Cf. Sadgrove
v. Hole, [19011 2 K. B. 1, 70 L. J. K. B. 455, 84 L. T. 647, 17 T. L. R.
332. But see Steele v. Edwards, (1898) 15 Ohio C. C. 52.
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Unsealed letters may be read by the postal authorities, but the
courts are inclined to require some evidence that they were so read
before holding the defendant liable."' Sealed letters may be
objectionable if such terms as "Bad Debt Collection Agency" are
printed on the envelope. 0  A defamatory statement over the
telephone has been conceded to be actionable. 1 And a placard,
posted at plaintiff's house, saying that collector has called and
intimating the consequences of not paying debts promptly, has been
held sufficient.62
The modern tendency in these cases is to protect the defendant,
if and only if the method of communication was, in the eyes of
the judge or jury, reasonable under the circumstances. They
differ somewhat from the overheard slander situations, for they
involve at least two steps, and each step may further a recognized
interest of defendant's, but there seems to be no adequate reason
why a similar approach could not be made in each type.
Defamatory publications in newspapers raise similar prob-
lems to conversations overheard and notices read. If the subject
is a matter of no public interest, the newspaper publication is
usually declared to be excessive"3 or an abuse of the privilege,"'
and liability follows as a matter of course. Earlier cases have
treated it as evidence of malice and left the question to the jury. "'
In cases involving the appointment or removal of a public
officer, or the signing of a bill passed by the legislators, there is,
of course, a privilege for appeals to the governor or other authority
with power to act. but if defamatory statements about these mat-
ters are printed in newspapers or pamphlets and distributed to
the public, the publication will ordinarily not be protected.60
In the election of public officers there is a sharp conflict in
the authorities as to whether a newspaper is conditionally privileged
59Fry v. McCord Bros., (1895) 95 Tenn. 678, 33 S. W. 568; Huth v.
Huth, [1915] 3 K. B. 32, 84 L. J. K. B. 1307, 113 L. T. 145. 31 T. L. R.
350. 6OMuetze v. Tuteur, (1890) 77 Wis. 236, 46 N. W. 123; State v.
Armstrong, (1891) 106 Mo. 395, 16 S. W. 604.
61Ostrowe v. Lee, (1931) 256 N. Y. 36. 175 N. E. 505.
G2Thompson v. Adelberg, (1918) 181 Ky. 487, 205 S. W. 558.
63Flynn v. Boglarsky, (1911) 164 Mich. 513, 129 N. W. 674.
'
4Lathrop v. Sundberg, (1909) 55 Wash. 144, 104 Pac. 176.05Hatch v. Lane, (1870) 105 Mass. 394; Smith v. Smith, (1889) 73
Mich. 445, 41 N. W. 499.6 0Hunt v. Bennett, (1859) 19 N. Y. 173; Woods v. Wiman, (1890)
122 N. Y. 445, 25 N. E. 919; Bingham v. Gaynor. (1911) 203 N. Y. 27,
96 N. E. 84.
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in making honestly believed but inaccurate statements of fact
about candidates. The majority of courts hold that the situation
is not privileged. 7  But a considerable minority recognize one,"'
and in these states the issue of excessive publication arises, since
the newspaper may circulate beyond the district where the electors
have a proper interest in the subject matter. While there is some
authority in the older cases for holding the defendant liable be-
cause of the excessive publication, 0 the excess is usually dis-
missed as "incidental" and the newspaper protected."0 Papers
published by various church organizations and dealing with affairs
of that church are similarly protected although they may be read
by some non-members. 1 The same rule has been applied to
other publications.
7 2
In these cases the issue is usually excessive publication, rather
than malice, and in one case, 73 which found for the plaintiff, the
court refused to let the defendant offer evidence of his good
faith. Obviously, the fact that a few copies fell into the hands
of outsiders does not indicate that defendant was actuated by an
unworthy motive. Here there may have been a delivery by
defendants' agent to privileged and unprivileged parties and thus
different acts performed, while in the slander cases the words
are spoken but once. But the important element here is the exist-
ence of the privilege, and if the law regards it as beneficial to
society that the information should be given to a considerable
number of people, the privilege would be unduly hampered if
67Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1893) 59 Fed.
530; Burt v. Advertiser News Co., (1891) 154 Mass. 238. 28 N. E. I;
Negley v. Farrow, (1882) 60 Md. 158; Post Publishing Co. v. Moloney.(1893) 50 Ohio St. 71, 33 N. E. 921; Sweeney v. Baker, (1878) 13 W. Va.
158.
6sColeman v. MacLennan, (1908) 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281; Friedell
v. Blakely Printing Co., (1925) 163 Minn. 226, 203 N. W. 974; Salinger
v. Cowles, (1922) 195 Iowa 873, 191 N. W. 167; McLean v. Merriman,
(1920) 42 S. D. 394, 175 N. W. 878; Snively v. Record Pub. Co., (1921)
185 Cal. 565, 198 Pac. 1.
69State v. Hoskins, (1899) 109 Iowa 656, 80 N. W. 1063; Buckstaff
v. Hicks, (1896) 94 Wis. 34, 68 N. W. 403.
7OColeman v. MacLennan, (1908) 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281; Mertens
v. Bee Publishing Co., (1904) 5 Neb. Unof. 592, 99 N. W. 847; Arnold
v. Ingrain, (1913) 151 Wis. 438. 138 N. W..111.
7iShurtleff v. Stevens, (1879) 51 Vt. 501; Redgate v. Roush, (1900)
61 Kan. 480, 59 Pac. 1050.72Burton v. Dickson, (1919) 104 Kan. 594, 180 Pac. 216. Cf.
Philadelnhia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Quigley, (1858) 21 How. (U.S.) 202. 16
L. Ed. 73; Gattis v. Kilgo, (1901) 128 N. C. 402. 38 S. E. 931.7 3State v. Hoskins, (1899) 109 Iowa 656, 80 N. W. 1063.
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liability were imposed because a few others also obtained the in-
formation. The defendant has made use of the privilege in a
reasonable manner, and more should not be required.
There is some similarity between the newspaper cases and
those relating to mercantile agencies. The English courts recog-
nize no privilege in the agency in giving information to its sub-
scribers,14 and this view has some American support .7  But most
American courts protect the agency in giving reports to an inter-
ested subscriber upon request.7 On the other hand, the sending
of reports to all subscribers, a large majority of whom will have
no interest in the particular plaintiff, is generally held to be un-
privileged.7 This may be distinguished from the newspaper cases
in that (1) it would here be much simpler to limit the informa-
tion to interested parties and (2) the proportion of subscribers
without interest in any given plaintiff is so large that it could
scarcely be dismissed as "incidental." The courts usually treat
the communications to interested and uninterested parties as
separate acts, with the second regarded as a wrongful publication.
Therefore. the good faith of the defendant offers no defense to
the action." but the courts sometimes attempt to reinforce their
decisions with verbiage about malice.7 1
Much of the confusion in the issue of excessive publication may
be attributed to changing ideas about the decision in Toogood v.
Spyring.80  The English court apparently regarded the master's
privilege in talking freely to the servants as of far more importance
than the servant's right to a good name. In this country today
we are inclined to give more weight to the position of the servant,
74MacIntosh v. Dun, [1908] A. C. 390, 77 L. J. P. C. 113, 99 L. T.
64, 24 T. L. R. 705, P. C.
75Pacific Packing Co. v. Bradstreet, (1914) 25 Idaho 696, 139 Pac.
1007; Johnson v. Bradstreet, (1886) 77 Ga. 172.76Ormsby v. Douglass, (1867) 37 N. Y. 477; Trussell v. Scarlett,
(C.C. Md. 1882) 18 Fed. 214. Cf. Pollasky v. Minchener, (1890) 81
Mich. 280, 46 N. W. 5; Bradstreet v. Gill, (1888) 72 Tex. 115, 9 S. W.
753; King v. Patterson, (1887) 49 N. J. L. 417, 9 At. 705.
7TTaylor v. Church, (1853) 8 N. Y. 452; Sunderlin v. Bradstreet,
(1871) 46 N. Y. 188; Commonwealth v. Stacey, (1871) 8 Phila. 617; King
v. Patterson, (1887) 49 N. J. L. 417, 9 At. 705; Bradstreet v. Gill, (1888)
72 Tex. 115, 9 S. W. 753; Pollasky v. Minchener, (1890) 81 Mich. 280,
46 N. W. 5; Mitchell v. Bradstreet, (1893) 116 Mo. 226, 22 S. W. 358, 724.8sSunderlin v. Bradstreet, (1871)' 46 N. Y. 188; King v. Patterson,
(1887) 49 N. J. L. 417. 9 Atl. 705.
'
0Bradstreet v. Gill. (1888) 72 Tex. 115, 9 S. W. 753; Pollasky v.
Minchener. (1890) 81 Mich. 280. 46 N. W. 5.80(1834) 1 Cr. 'f. & R. 181. 4 Tyr. 582, 3 L. J. Ex. 347.
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and are not satisfied that defendant should always be excused
merely because his motives were not objectionable regardless of.
the negligence or publicity involved. But the courts have been
unwilling to deny expressly the requirement of malice, which
Togood v. Spyring sets out, but have at times reached results
which they regarded as socially desirable by broadening the mean-
ing of malice or by referring only to the publication. In the
allied fields before mentioned, the courts are tending to protect the
defendant, if and only if his mode of communication is reasonable
under the circumstances. It would seem that the same doctrine
might well be applied to situations where the slanderous state-
ments were overheard.
